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The Meaning of Anti-Americanism: A Performative 
Approach to Anti-American Prejudice
Felix Knappertsbusch, Department of Sociology, Justus Liebig University, Giessen, Germany
A contribution to the ongoing debate on how anti-Americanism can be adequately conceptualized and how such prejudice can be distinguished from legit-
imate criticism, arguing that part of these conceptual problems arise from a too narrow focus on defining anti-Americanism and the use of standardized em-
pirical operationalizations. Such approaches exhibit severe limitations in grasping the flexibility of the phenomenon in everyday discourse and often 
underestimate or ignore the interpretive aspect involved in identifying utterances as anti-American prejudice. Alternatively, a performative approach is pro-
posed, understanding anti-Americanism as a network of speech acts bound by family resemblance rather than identical features. In combination with quali-
tative empirical research methods such a conceptualization is especially suited to account for the flexible, situated use of anti-American utterances. At the 
same time it grants reflexivity to the research concept, in the sense of a close description of the scientific application of the notion of anti-Americanism. Two 
empirical examples from an interview study on anti-American speech in Germany illustrate the potential of such an approach, providing an insight into how 
anti-Americanism is incorporated into the construction and expression of racist and revisionist national identifications in everyday discourse.
In the field of research on prejudice, stereotyping, and dis-
crimination, anti-Americanism is one of the rather con-
troversial and often neglected topics. The notion of 
anti-Americanism is often accompanied by debates about 
the extent and intent of its application, what counts as 
anti-American, and what should be regarded as legitimate 
criticism of the United States. The concept is frequently 
dismissed as mere political rhetoric, and critics deny it has 
any substance, much more than with many other forms of 
prejudice (Hahn 2003, 20–21; Markovits 2007, 13 ff.). 
Those claiming such a position often regard anti-
Americanism as a legitimate and necessary form of politi-
cal protest (Misik 2003; ProKla 1989). Some of the 
opponents of criticism of anti-Americanism even affirm-
atively label themselves anti-American, while claiming that 
there is nothing wrong with prejudice when it comes to the 
United States (O’Connor 2007, 13–14; Markovits 2007, 25). 
While I do not mean to ignore the specific characteristics 
of different forms of prejudice and discrimination, or 
equate them directly, the general rejection of criticism of 
anti-Americanism seems to be rather troubling. I agree 
with Brendon O’Connor’s slightly hyperbolical claim: “to 
overcome anti-American prejudice, we first need to over-
come the prejudice against seeing anti-Americanism as a 
form of prejudice” (O’Connor 2007, 19).
However, at the same time researchers in this field agree 
that there is good reason to criticize the current state of re-
search on anti-Americanism:
Despite its currency in popular discourse, anti-Americanism is a 
topic that has received limited attention by academics. This lack 
of attention is probably due to two factors. First, anti-American-
ism is a term that is difficult to conceptualize. Second, it easily 
lends itself to (mis)use as a pejorative.
(Johnston 2006, 2–3)
How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine that 
we should describe games to him, and we might add: “This and 
similar things are called ‘games’”. And do we know any more about 
it ourselves? Is it only other people who we cannot tell exactly what 
a game is? – But this is not ignorance. We do not know the bound-
aries because none have been drawn.
(Wittgenstein 1967, § 69)
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Brendon O’Connor claims that research on anti-
Americanism seems to have somewhat prematurely rushed 
past more basic conceptual issues that still need to be dealt 
with:
The existing academic literature provides endless divisions 
between different so-called sources of anti-Americanism but 
there is too little scholarship on what anti-Americanism con-
ceptually is and thus how anti-Americanism can effectively be 
differentiated from criticism.
(O’Connor 2007, 7)
Some of the most informative work on anti-Americanism 
seeks to resolve these conceptual problems by employing 
the notion of prejudice (ibid., 13–14). This approach has 
many virtues and constitutes one of the most promising 
developments in current anti-Americanism research. It 
provides useful distinctions and theoretical concepts, while 
connecting the study of anti-Americanism more closely to 
the large and well-established body of prejudice research. 
Secondly, as O’Connor rightfully indicates, this anti-
Americanism-as-prejudice perspective places the notion of 
anti-Americanism in a strong normative context with “sig-
nificant cultural and political resonance in the fight against 
racism and discrimination” (ibid.). However, at the same 
time, I argue that considerable shortcomings in the way 
prejudice is commonly conceptualized limit the concept’s 
potential to resolve the problems that it is supposed to. 
What is interesting about both Johnston’s and O’Connor’s 
diagnoses is their mention of a close association between 
conceptual and practical or ethical aspects of the notion of 
anti-Americanism. The disagreement about how anti-
Americanism should be defined seems to be strongly re-
lated to the question of how a good use of the concept 
might be construed (for example, how anti-Americanism 
can be differentiated from criticism of the United States). 
In fact, it seems to me that this controversy is at least as 
much about the application of the concept of anti-
Americanism, as it is about its definition.1 This question of 
a good use of definitions will thus occupy a central place in 
my exploration. I will argue that conceptions of anti-
Americanism as prejudice often focus too much on strict 
definitions of their subject matter, dismissing the import-
ance of also accounting for the immense variability in their 
application to concrete empirical phenomena, i.e. reflecting 
on the empirical application of such concepts. I will go on 
to show how these conceptual foundations, which stand 
very much in the tradition of the “prejudice as attitude” 
approach (Nelson 2002, 8–9), limit the scope for address-
ing the problems outlined above. In my view, they are too 
focused on defining an essential core of anti-Americanism: 
“the ‘real thing’, the real anti-Americanism” (Markovits 
2007, 12). Applying a distinction Andrei Markovits has 
fruitfully applied to the criticism of anti-Americanism 
(ibid.), one could say that research seems to concentrate 
too much on what anti-Americanism “is” and too little on 
what it actually “does.” The reciprocal relation of seman-
tics and pragmatics in meaning-making (both lay and 
scientific) is reduced to a mere problem of definitional im-
precision, to be resolved by the abstract listing of the right 
criteria. In contrast to this, I will stress the “priority of 
practice” both in lay discourse and scientific con-
ceptualization (Bloor 2001).
A similar criticism has recently been put forward by Klaus 
Baethge and colleagues (2010), pointing out how notions 
of anti-Americanism are often too occupied with defini-
tions of the content of anti-American stereotypes, while 
neglecting a thorough investigation of their flexible func-
tionality in everyday discourse. Building on this line of ar-
gument, I propose a performative perspective on 
anti-Americanism, grasping it as an open network of 
speech acts. In this perspective the focus is shifted towards 
anti-Americanism as practical meaning-making, concern-
ing not definable features of the prejudiced psyche or lexi-
cal-semantical core elements of anti-American speech, but 
anti-Americanism as embedded in the discursive practice 
of “everyday ideology” (Martin 2010, 62). Such highlight-
ing of the performative aspect of anti-American speech 
1 Similarly, Konrad Jarausch has suggested in-
cluding the meta-debate on the scientific and politi-
cal use of the term itself in research on anti-
 Americanism (Jarausch 2005, 46–47).
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simultaneously serves as a reflection on the empirical use 
of the scientific concept of anti-Americanism: reflecting on 
the everyday language use of anti-American talk reciproc-
ally implies reflecting on the scientific language use of talk 
about anti-Americanism. The assumption that we cannot 
theoretically know or properly define what anti-
Americanism is unless we empirically work through vari-
ous instances of what it does is essential to this approach. In 
fact, what anti-Americanism is, as determined by defini-
tions, is only a reflection on the practice of what anti-
American speech does. This emphasis on practical meaning 
in context necessitates the use of methods of empirically 
grounded theory construction,2 which have as yet received 
very limited attention in the study of anti-Americanism.3 I 
will argue that while standardized empirical methods show 
serious limitations with regard to a performative per-
spective on anti-American speech, qualitative methods 
within the framework of empirically grounded theory con-
struction fit this theoretical approach particularly well.
1. Current Conceptualizations of Anti-Americanism as Prejudice
As described above, the anti-Americanism-as-prejudice 
perspective can be seen as one of the most promising de-
velopments in current anti-Americanism research, since it 
provides a more detailed and conceptually consistent 
understanding of the matter than many other con-
ceptualizations which, as O’Connor points out (2007, 10 
ff., 19), often use the term either in a too liberal or an 
overly restricted way. Understanding anti-Americanism as 
a form of prejudice seems to avoid both of these tendencies 
and is therefore adopted by many researchers (O’Connor 
2007, Markovits 2007, Keohane and Katzenstein 2007, 
Beyer and Liebe 2010). However, despite its obvious ad-
vantages, the notion of prejudice is far from guaranteeing a 
more concise and insightful approach to the phenomenon.
Scientific concepts essentially have to meet the same de-
mands as any abstract concept in everyday language use: 
They have to be understandable as distinctive signifiers of 
certain referents, but have to do so in a wide variety of dif-
ferent contexts. Thus, the question is: How can we identify 
anti-Americanism as a general concept that is at the same 
time flexible enough to denote a potentially infinite 
number of particular actions (i.e. expressions of anti-
Americanism)? Definitions of anti-American prejudice 
typically seek to deal with this problem analytically, by 
naming “core markers” (O’Connor 2007, 2) or “minimal 
characteristics” (Markovits 2007, 12) as criteria for the ad-
equate application of the definition. But even if these crite-
ria are closely defined, the difficulty of judging exactly 
when they are met remains. To pick out just one example, 
here are the central characteristics of anti-American preju-
dice cited by Markovits (referring to Josef Joffe):
1. Stereotypization (that is, statements of the type: “This is 
what they are all like.”)
2. Denigration (the ascription of a collective moral or cul-
tural inferiority to the target group)
3. Omnipotence (e.g., “They control the media, the econ-
omy, the world.”)
4. Conspiracy (e.g., “This is what they want to do to us 
surreptitiously and stealthily – sully our racial purity, 
destroy our traditional, better, and morally superior 
ways.”)
5. Obsession (a constant preoccupation with the perceived 
and feared evil and powerful ways of the hated group) 
(Markovits 2007, 12.)
The question is: when are these criteria actually fulfilled? 
For example, a statement like “The Americans are super-
ficial and selfish” surely does appear stereotypical. But then 
again, there are many conceivable contexts in which it 
would probably not be viewed as an expression of preju-
dice. After all, we use simplifications and exaggerations in 
our everyday speech all the time, judging individuals by 
their group membership without being prejudiced.4 Fur-
thermore, can the statement be regarded as denigrating? 
The context of utterance may very well not imply a strong 
2 The term “empirically grounded theory con-
struction” is used here in a broader sense, not spe-
cifically referring to Glaser and Strauss’s approach.
3 A notable exception being the abovementioned 
study by Baethge and colleagues (2010), who very 
fruitfully apply a reconstructive empirical approach 
to material gathered via group discussions.
4 Keohane and Katzenstein, who apply the notion 
of cognitive “schemas” to their concept of anti-
Americanism point out a similar problem: “Schemas 
do not necessarily imply bias. Indeed they can be 
based on a coherent worldview based on a reason-
able interpretation of available facts.” (Keohane and 
Katzenstein 2007, 13)
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evaluative notion or a sense of hierarchy. In addition, not 
all forms of devaluation or hierarchization are generally 
denigrating in a prejudiced way.5 Does a speaker necess-
arily have to ascribe omnipotence and conspiracy to “the 
Americans” for his speech to be counted as anti-American? 
And what is meant by the clinical term “obsession”? In 
what sense are speakers of anti-American discourse obsess-
ive, and do they have to be?6 Moreover, if not all of these 
criteria are necessary, which ones in which combinations 
would be sufficient? Can there even be a fixed set of necess-
ary and sufficient conditions?7
As we can see, notions like the one cited above focus on 
typical features of anti-Americanism as a definite concept, 
but largely disregard a systematic account of how these fea-
tures are flexibly realized within actual utterances. This be-
comes especially problematic when dealing with 
expressions of anti-Americanism that are not cases of blunt 
ideological agitation, but part of everyday discourse, 
“speech acts of ordinary people who don’t hold political 
office … and who haven’t made a profession out of writing 
or speaking” (Martin 2010, 40; see also Baethge et al. 2010). 
To be sure, most authors are aware that their definitions 
have to be applied in a context-specific and situated 
manner. For instance, Andrei Markovits has repeatedly em-
phasized the importance of tone and context in describing 
the anti-American quality of actual speech: “The content 
defines, but the context lends meaning.” (2007, 16) How-
ever, current research on anti-Americanism mostly ap-
proaches this problem as if it were predominantly about 
finding a “more precise definition of the term” (O’Connor 
2007, 6), neglecting the issue of concept application. Ac-
cording to a practice theoretical perspective on language 
and meaning (Potter 2011), the norms of language use do 
not function like axiomatic definitions, but have to retain a 
certain amount of uncertainty. This “systematic am-
biguity” is only suspended in the practice of everyday dis-
course (Winch 2008 [1958], 25). Applying this notion to 
definitive conceptions of anti-Americanism, they face the 
same problem as any strictly axiomatic understanding of 
language use. As Peter Winch formulates with regard to 
how ostensive definitions are unable to account for the ap-
plication of the word “Everest”:
However emphatically I point at this mountain here before me 
and however emphatically I utter the words “this mountain”, 
my decision still has to be applied in the future, and it is pre-
cisely what is involved in such an application that is here in 
question. Hence no formula will help to solve this problem; we 
must always come to a point at which we have to give an 
account of the application of the formula. 
(Winch 2008 [1958], 27)
Accordingly, the problems of applying the concept of anti-
Americanism will not be solved by a more precise defini-
tion alone, but will require a conceptualization that 
reflexively integrates its own application as part of the sub-
ject matter. However, since this integration cannot be 
achieved in a strictly formalized manner, it will require the 
close description of empirical examples of the phenom-
enon in question. This has implications for how we con-
ceptualize anti-Americanism in two different yet reciprocal 
regards: Firstly, it concerns the way in which we view our 
scientific approach towards investigating the social phe-
nomenon in question. Secondly, and by the same token, it 
concerns the way in which we grasp the subject matter 
itself, i.e. how we conceptualize expressions of anti-
Americanism. These aspects will be discussed in the two 
following sections.
2. Anti-Americanism as Performative Utterance
The conceptual problems discussed above can be summar-
ized by the question: How can the anti-American meaning 
of an utterance be grasped and what, consequently, is the 
meaning of the term anti-Americanism? As an alternative 
5 For example, the everyday distinctive practices 
between adherents of different sub-cultural move-
ments surely express a certain amount of group-
based hierarchy and in-group favoritism, as does 
everyday chat with friends about colleagues, etc. 
Ethically problematic as some of these practices 
may be, to simply include them in the concept of 
prejudice would empty the notion of much of its 
specific meaning.
6 This also ties in with the problem of “individua-
lism” found in most prejudice research (Wetherell 
2012, 161 ff.). Can the anti-American quality of 
(speech) acts really be grasped as a psychological 
condition of the speakers?
7 My criticism here is in many respects congruent 
with the arguments made against definitional con-
cepts in cognitive psychology from a graded struc-
ture and prototypes perspective (Rosch 1999). I will 
come back to this in section 2.
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to a definition-based answer I propose a performative or 
speech-act-theory perspective. Simply put, the central 
question raised by such an approach is not what is said in 
an utterance, but what is done by saying it.
The notion of speech acts is most prominently associated 
with the work of John L. Austin, whose influential How to 
Do Things With Words dealt with what Sadock describes as 
“the observation that certain sorts of sentences, e.g., I 
christen this ship the Joseph Stalin; I now pronounce you 
man and wife, and the like, seem designed to do something, 
here to christen and wed, respectively, rather than merely to 
say something” (Sadock 2006, 54). After initially introduc-
ing a distinction between “Constatives” and “Per-
formatives” (ibid.), to theoretically grasp this interplay of 
“saying” and “doing,” Austin eventually acknowledged that 
every speech act, even the mere stating of facts, can be seen 
to have a performative aspect (Austin 1975, 91–92, 133 ff.), 
and suggested three general levels of description instead: 
locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts (Austin 
1975, 101 ff.). While Austin’s “performative speech acts” 
primarily referred to a certain class of institutionalized illo-
cutionary acts (to promise, to wed, etc.), I will use the con-
cept “performativity” in a broader sense similar to the 
applications put forward by Margaret Wetherell and Jon-
athan Potter (1992, 90): A performative perspective in this 
sense focuses on what Austin calls “perlocutionary” acts, 
i.e. the effect of a speech act within a certain context of ac-
tion. Accordingly, I propose to grasp anti-Americanism as 
performative utterance, i.e. as the perlocutions evoked by 
certain contextual uses of certain semantic motifs, not the 
mere definable features of such uses or motifs.8 This notion 
of performativity is closely related to Wittgenstein’s view on 
the contextual nature of meaningful speech in “language 
games” that are “part of an activity, or of a form of life” 
(Wittgenstein 1967, 11). The meaning of a sentence cannot 
be grasped without understanding its functional role within 
a specific language game, which in turn has to be described 
as nested in the broader practices of a form of life: “To obey 
a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of 
chess are customs (uses, institutions). To understand a sen-
tence means to understand a language. To understand a 
language means to be master of a technique.” (Wittgenstein 
1967, 81)9 Let me point out that this embedment of lin-
guistic meaning in everyday practices does not aim to de-
scribe the functions of speech acts as additional events 
exterior to “mere” speech, i.e. something that follows from 
it causally or goes along with it coincidentally. It rather de-
scribes a perspective on linguistic meaning, in which it can 
only be understood as a contextualized form of practice: 
“the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (ibid., 
20). Thus, when I talk about anti-American meaning as a 
performative effect, I do not mean to investigate whether 
certain speech acts have certain direct causal effects (e.g. if 
somebody was actually discriminated against or harmed as 
a consequence of this particular speech act), but rather to 
highlight the practical context as a necessary component of 
interpreting something as anti-American. Such interpre-
tation then implies reconstructing possible perlocutions 
from the specific point of view of a prejudice critique.
In the field of prejudice research, a practice theoretical ap-
proach has been developed in the theory of rhetorical and 
discursive social psychology, most prominently pursued by 
Michael Billig, Margaret Wetherell, and Jonathan Potter 
(Martin 2010, 106 ff.). In their work on Mapping the Lan-
guage of Racism, Wetherell and Potter develop a criticism of 
traditional prejudice research, which I will apply to the ar-
gument outlined above. By pointing out the limitations of 
an approach that is mainly concerned with “defining the 
content of racism in an a priori fashion” (Wetherell and 
Potter 1992, 69), they focus on “discourse in action rather 
than language as an abstract system” (71; see also Billig 
1991, 44). This approach treats “as primary what may be 
called the ‘action orientation’ of discourse”:
The sense of texts or talk is not seen as derived from their 
abstract meaning or organization but from their situated use. 
8 Thus, when I talk about performative anti-
Americanism, I am not implying anti-American 
speech that could be classified as “performative 
speech acts” in Austin’s narrower sense. I am not 
talking about anti-Americanisms as something com-
parable to “promises,” “christenings,” “weddings,” 
or the like.
9 Note how Wittgenstein, in contrast to Austin’s 
understanding of performative speech, employs a 
much broader notion of institutions and customs.
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By the same token, the nature of the use to which any text or 
talk is put is not derivable from the abstract or dictionary 
meanings of the terms used.
(Wetherell and Potter 1992, 90)
Thus, this approach suggests a distinction of “interpretative 
resource” and “the flexible application of that resource in 
practice” to reconstruct the meaning of prejudiced speech 
(Wetherell 2012, 171). Following this line of thinking, I 
apply a heuristic distinction between semantic content of 
utterances (in a lexical-grammatical sense) and their use in 
context as the basis for my empirically grounded notion of 
anti-Americanism. Both of these aspects, semantics and 
use, are to be conceptualized as essentially contingent with 
regard to anti-American meaning, i.e. neither of the two 
suffices in itself to classify a prejudiced speech act as anti-
American; it is the performative effect of certain situated 
combinations that constitutes anti-American meaning 
(Wetherell and Potter 1992, 70, 90–91).10
This means that, contrary to traditional definitions of 
prejudice as “faulty and inflexible generalizations” that are 
“factually wrong” (Martin 2010, 67 ff., 104; also Wetherell 
and Potter 1992, 67 ff.), the criticism of anti-Americanism 
(or any prejudice, for that matter) cannot be primarily 
concerned with propositional truth claims. Even though 
anti-Americanism may often present itself as mere con-
stative speech, criticism needs to be primarily concerned 
with the practical or ethical meaning of what people ac-
tually do when performing such speech acts, not the factual 
validity of their claims (Baethge et al. 2010, 373). This also 
serves as a strong argument against “correspondence ap-
proach[es]” and “representational analyses” of prejudice 
(Wetherell and Potter 1992, 67 ff.; Holz 2001, 62), which 
still are rather common in anti-Americanism research.11
The claim that anti-Americanism is not primarily a matter 
of propositional truth, however, should not be misunder-
stood as an argument for the arbitrariness of its semantic 
content. It is important to acknowledge that semantic con-
tent and functional use are interconnected: certain sem-
antic content is needed to achieve specific functional 
outcomes (Holz 2001, 59–60), although it may not ex-
clusively provide the means to achieve these functions 
(Baethge et al. 2010, 377 ff.).
Focusing on the performative aspect of (anti-American) 
prejudice also highlights the super-individual quality of the 
phenomenon, since it is concerned with grasping the “ideo-
logical thrust” of utterances (Wetherell 2012, 171): “This 
means studying thinking, and the holding of opinions, in 
its wider social context” (Billig 1991, 1). Although current 
notions of prejudice in social psychology acknowledge the 
contextual factors of its expression, most concepts still re-
tain an individualistic bias, conceiving the phenomenon 
first and foremost by individual factors which are then 
placed in social context: “Prejudice remains a personal pa-
thology, a failure of inner-directed empathy and intellect, 
rather than a social pathology, shaped by power relations 
and the conflicting vested interests of groups” (Wetherell 
2012, 165). A performative approach tries to integrate both 
aspects, reading utterances of prejudice as expressions of 
“social pathologies” (see also Honneth 2007) while at the 
same time accounting for the fragmented and flexible char-
acter of their subjective realization.12
10 Despite the principal contingency in the connec-
tion of relevant semantic content and its anti-Ameri-
can or non-anti-American use, it has to be assumed 
that some motifs relevant to anti-American prejudice 
may coincide more often with anti-American use than 
others; some may even necessitate such applications. 
Wetherell and Potter mention a similar idea with re-
gard to racism: “We acknowledge that there are some 
interpretative resources which will constitute social 
action in racist ways on nearly every occasion they are 
deployed. However, to focus on these is to ignore the 
other, sometimes more flexible, resources which char-
acterize a good deal of ‘modern racism’” (71).
11 Examples of such approaches, seeking to grasp 
anti-Americanism via definitions of “Americanism” 
or “Americanization” include: Srp (2005, 32, 40) 
and Birkenkämper (2006, 24–25). Keohane and Kat-
zenstein also express a representational leaning in 
their concept (2007, 3). For critical remarks on such 
conceptualizations see also O’Connor (2007, 17–18) 
and O’Connor and Griffiths (2006, 1).
12 The term social pathology refers to the para-
doxical normative basis of critical theory, which has 
to simultaneously assume the falsity of ideological 
thought and consider itself to be caught up in it. A 
critical approach to the subject of investigation thus 
implies avoiding both “a radical elitism, which 
downgrades individual autonomy” as well as “an in-
dividual analysis, which accepts uncritically the 
frameworks of power” (Billig 1991, 13). Since such a 
critique cannot assume a viewpoint outside of ideo-
logical social conditions, it is not concerned with a 
“correction” of “definitely false” consciousness, but 
with the interpretive reflection and transformation 
of a false social practice which it considers itself to be 
an active part of (cf. Menke 1996; Bonacker 2000).
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To provide a theoretical framework that systematically in-
cludes the considerations of speech act theory discussed 
above, I propose the following concept: Anti-Americanism 
is the performative aspect of speech acts that are char-
acterized by the interplay of particular America motifs and 
particular situated uses.
Of course, this notion only provides a “heuristic frame-
work” (Kelle 2005, 14) which, to be theoretically in-
formative, has to be combined with empirical research. A 
conceptualization of anti-American prejudice will thus con-
sist of an empirical “mapping” (Wetherell and Potter 1992) 
of relevant America motifs and their different situated uses, 
combined with examples of actual anti-American perform-
ances. Here are some examples of such motifs and uses.13
through the reproduction of one or more typical America 
motifs. As can be seen from the example functions listed, 
conceptualizing anti-Americanism in this perspective co-
incides with a close description of the more general ideo-
logical phenomena it is nested in. A functional connection 
to antisemitism and racism seems to be an important part 
of this ideological context of anti-American speech, while 
all three share strong ties to nationalist identity con-
struction. I will point out some functional affinities and 
specific differences between these phenomena in more de-
tail in the empirical examples below.
Thus far I have concentrated on the potential of a per-
formative approach to account for the flexibility of anti-
American utterances. However, the question remains open, 
how such a diversification of the concept can at the same 
time satisfy the need to comprehensively identify anti-
Americanism, i.e. distinguish different manifestations of 
anti-Americanism as manifestations of a common phenom-
enon. I will draw on Wittgensteins notion of “family resem-
blances” to suggest an answer (Wittgenstein 1967, 32).
In his famous example of the word “game” and its mean-
ingful use, Wittgenstein comes to the interesting conclusion 
that, even though there is obviously a practical under-
standing of the term in everyday language, it is impossible 
to define a single essential feature, “something that is com-
mon to all” of its applications (31). He describes several 
different understandings of the word, concluding that “the 
result of this examination is: we see a complicated network 
of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes 
overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail” (32). 
Following this general description of the distinctive yet 
flexible use of a concept, I propose to grasp the notion of 
anti-Americanism as a family of speech acts, bound not by 
identity but similarity of features. The concept is illustrated 
in Figure 1, where the two lower boxes represent the inven-
tory of relevant semantics and applications (as described in 
Table 1), and the ellipse above (dashed line) comprises the 
family of particular anti-American speech acts.
13 The table represents an excerpt from the auth-
or’s ongoing dissertation on contemporary anti-
American speech in Germany. The examples are pre-
liminary results of empirical work in progress and 
are thus to be treated with a degree of caution.
Table 1: Examples of America motifs relevant to anti-American speech and 
possible anti-American applications
Relevant America motifs
· The United States acts as an over-
bearing “world police,” interfering 
with other nations’ affairs
· American culture is superficial, or 
Americans have no real culture
· Americans are hypocritical, for 
example in their moral and religious 
behavior
· Americans are overly individualistic 
and unable to develop profound so-
cial bonds
· Americans are uneducated and 
naive
· …
Typical uses in anti-American speech
· Externalization of uncomfortable as-
pects of (national) in-group identity, 
e.g. self-contradictory elements
· Deflection of anticipated moral 
sanctioning for certain opinions or 
arguments (e.g. nationalism) via 
comparison to the United States
· A camouflaged expression of anti-
Semitism or racism
· …
Again, I want to stress that the reproduction of the 
America motifs cited above does not necessarily make an 
utterance anti-American, nor do the communicative func-
tions given on the right hand side of the table by them-
selves suffice as criteria for anti-American prejudice. To be 
counted as anti-American speech, an utterance needs to be 
shown to achieve one or more of the given functions 
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Figure 1: Anti-Americanism as Family Resemblance
the concept of anti-Americanism, cannot be explained 
without reference to the particular features of its members. 
Thus, the anti-American quality of an utterance is not a 
feature that can be directly observed or defined. Instead, we 
need to account for what anti-Americanism is by showing 
similarities within its flexible realizations. This requires an 
interpretative act of regarding something as anti-American, 
as I will point out in more detail in the following section. 
As John O’Connor has suggested with regard to con-
ceptualizing anti-American ideology, the different ex-
pressions of anti-Americanism are seen here too as bound 
by a “flexible coherence” (O’Connor 2007, 16). But instead 
of assuming an “ideological ‘core’” binding these ideas, as 
O’Connor does (ibid.), I stress the conceptual idea of a 
coreless network of commonalities. To adopt another 
Wittgensteinian metaphor: such a notion of anti-
Americanism allows us to “extend our concept … as in 
spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength 






Relevant motifs/semantics Relevant uses/functions
The essential difference from analytical definitions of anti-
Americanism is that the members of the family do not 
share a universally common feature (or set of features), at 
least none that could justify their classification as anti-
American:14 “aa 1” and “aa 3” show common functions of 
different motifs while “aa 3” and “aa 4” achieve different 
functions via the same motifs. By way of resemblance, this 
connects “aa 1” to “aa 4” via “aa 3,” while “aa 2” is con-
nected to the rest of the group via “aa 5.” Thus, no single 
feature binds all five cases together. They can be denomi-
nated as anti-American only with reference to the family of 
anti-American discourse, i.e. their resemblances to other 
anti-American speech acts whose features are not included 
in every family member. What makes an utterance anti-
American is not located entirely in the utterance itself, but 
in its association to a group of utterances that make up the 
discourse of anti-American speech. Reciprocally, the gen-
eral features of the family of anti-American discourse, i.e. 
14 For instance, even though all expressions of 
anti-Americanism may include a direct or indirect 
reference to Americans or the United States, this 
common criterion cannot distinguish anti-Ameri-
canism from non-anti-American language uses.
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of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre 
runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of 
many fibres” (Wittgenstein 1967, 32).15 Of course, the em-
pirical analysis of such a network of similarities will at dif-
ferent stages result in stating the most common 
anti-American uses and America motifs, in an attempt to 
provide a general description of the characteristics of anti-
Americanism. But we must not misconstrue these general 
characteristics as something that exists in the same way as 
the particular realizations do (ibid.). Such treatment of the 
social practice of anti-American speech runs the risk of 
creating “fictional things” (Billig 2011, 14 ff.) instead of in-
formative accounts of what people do, thereby overlooking 
the flexibility and functionality of such actions.
3. Methodological Implications of a Performative Approach to 
Anti-Americanism
I have argued for shifting the focus of anti-Americanism 
research towards the empirical application of its concepts 
by investigating the situated use of America stereotypes. I 
will now point out how methods of qualitative empirical 
research can help to foster such an approach. This is dis-
cussed within the frame of empirically grounded theory 
construction, where the topic of theory application has 
been extensively discussed (Kelle 1998; Alvesson and Sköld-
berg 2008, 16–17).
It is a commonly acknowledged insight in general episte-
mology and the methodology of empirical science, that any 
empirical observation constitutes a “‘theory-laden’ under-
taking” (Hanson 1972, 19; see also Kelle 2005, 3; Alvesson 
and Sköldberg 2008, 17), i.e. any observation of something 
presupposes prior knowledge enabling us to see it as some-
thing. Applying a concept of anti-Americanism constitutes 
such an operation of “seeing as” (Hanson 1972), which 
means that it contains a necessary element of interpre-
tation. The anti-American meaning is not merely some-
thing which is “in the data,” but also in the act of scientific 
observation. I have shown above that this interpretative act 
of “seeing as,” i.e. applying the concept, cannot be grasped 
in an axiomatic fashion (see section 1). Nonetheless, 
methods of standardized operationalization, which are pre-
dominant in anti-Americanism research, can be regarded 
as an attempt to do exactly that: concept application in a 
formalized manner. In contrast to this, I will argue that the 
interpretative aspect of concept application needs to be 
mirrored by the methodology of empirical research, which 
can be achieved through the hermeneutics of qualitative 
empirical study.
It has been repeatedly noted that standardized measures of 
anti-Americanism, especially common survey instruments, 
“risk imposing a conceptual unity on extremely diverse sets 
of political processes that mean different things in different 
contexts” (Keohane and Katzenstein 2007, 19; see also 
O’Connor 2007, 6). Such measurements are most com-
monly operationalized via the scaling of agreement to cer-
tain statements using instruments ranging from simply 
asking about approval or disapproval of US politics or the 
United States in general (Chiozza 2007) to more distinc-
tively assessing respondents’ agreement or disagreement 
with items expressing typical semantic content of anti-
American speech (Knappertsbusch and Kelle 2010; Beyer 
and Liebe 2010; Schwan 1999). In any case, this kind of 
empirical application may identify the reproduction of rel-
evant America stereotypes, but tells us hardly anything 
about how these motifs are used by the respondents. As I 
argue above, to assess the anti-American meaning of an ut-
terance it is most important to observe not only certain 
stereotypes, but also their situated use. A standardized op-
15 As noted in section 1, my proposed understand-
ing of the concept is very much in line with prototype 
theory as pursued by Eleanor Rosch. Without being 
able to go into further detail here, this applies es-
pecially with regard to her understanding of concepts 
as bound by family resemblance rather than necess-
ary and sufficient conditions, her rejection of solip-
sism or individualism, the context-dependency of 
concept-meaning, and the participatory rather than 
identifying character of concepts (Rosch 2012, 68 ff.).
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erationalization does not provide the necessary context to 
read an utterance as anti-American in its use. To be sure, 
this by no means renders standardized surveys inappropri-
ate to the study of (anti-American) prejudice: they remain 
an indispensable tool for assessing the prevalence of certain 
patterns of interpretation within larger populations (Mar-
tin 2010, 122 ff.) and describing models of probabilistic 
causality (Kelle 2008, 181 ff.). But, strictly speaking, they 
can never grasp anti-American speech in action: the stan-
dardized operationalization provides a black box of prob-
ability, however plausible the instrument construction may 
be, rather than an account of the actual use of the phrases 
they survey. To give such an account, we need to approach 
expressions of anti-Americanism as readable texts that pro-
vide more vivid information about what actors do by utter-
ing them. Methods of interpretative empirical research can 
provide the means for such reconstructions of the anti-
American meaning of utterances. Material gathered 
through qualitative research (Lincoln and Guba 2005, 10 
ff.), such as transcripts of non-standardized interviews, 
provide an opportunity to observe the reproduction of cer-
tain America images and interpret them as (non-)anti-
American utterances in their situated use.16 Such a 
combination of empirical and theoretical practice can be 
described as a form of empirically grounded theory con-
struction (Kelle 1998). While research following the 
quantitative empirical paradigm favors a “hypothetico-
deductive model of theory generation” (Kelle 2005, 16), in 
which theory development and empirical hypothesis-test-
ing are consecutive, the methodology of empirically 
grounded theory construction contests such a strict divi-
sion of theoretical and empirical research practice. Instead, 
it favors a model of theory generation in which empirical 
observation and theoretical understanding and/or ex-
planation are reciprocal: theory generation becomes the 
scientific practice of “seeing as,” in which theoretical and 
empirical aspects are inextricably intertwined (Kalthoff 
2008, 8–9). Such a methodological framework corresponds 
nicely with the conceptual notion of family resemblance 
outlined above, in which the theoretical abstractions re-
main reciprocally bound to their empirical realizations and 
vice versa.
4. Two Empirical Examples of Anti-American Speech
Applying the heuristic distinction between America motifs 
and their situated anti-American use, I will show how cer-
tain America images can be used in an ideological context 
that justifies reading them as anti-American speech. To il-
lustrate my proposition that the criticism of anti-American 
prejudice is not primarily a matter of propositional truth, I 
have chosen examples in which anti-American speech re-
volves around images that might generally be seen as ex-
pressions of a prejudice-critique, not prejudice: the image 
of the United States as a racist society and the con-
demnation of crimes against Native Americans. I will show 
how these motifs are employed in the context of (1) a xe-
nophobic racial nationalism and (2) an obscuration and 
relativization of the Holocaust as a means to rehabilitate a 
consistently positive German national identity.
The examples are taken from a sample of qualitative inter-
views conducted during the fall of 2011.17 Cases were se-
lected from a sample previously collected for a 
standardized survey on different forms of prejudice and 
ideological attitudes in Germany in the summer of 2011. 
The interview participants were selected on the basis of 
their high scoring responses on a six-item anti-
Americanism scale. Participants were re-contacted and in-
terviewed by telephone, conducting semi-structured 
interviews with the help of a flexible interview guide. 
Loosely drawing on the techniques of cognitive interview-
ing (Willis 2005; Martin 2010, 189 ff.), the guide included 
the items of the anti-Americanism scale to which partici-
pants had already responded in the standardized survey. In 
the course of the interview they were presented with their 
previous responses and asked to elaborate on these.
16 To be sure, such non-standardized data are of 
course also “artificial” interactions, co-constructed 
by researchers and respondents, and cannot be con-
ceived as providing a “direct insight” into the every-
day practice of participants. What distinguishes 
them from standardized research methods is that 
they leave as much space as possible for the sponta-
neous actions and associations of the respondents 
and thus provide material that allows for ex post 
hermeneutical and reflexive analyses (Davies 2008, 4 
ff.; for a critical view on qualitative interviewing as a 
research tool see Potter and Hepburn 2005).
17 The survey was made possible by the research 
training group on “Group Focused Enmity: Causes, 
Phenomenology, Consequences” funded by the Ger-
man Research Foundation: http://www.uni-mar
burg.de/menschenfeindlichkeit.
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4.1. Anti-Americanism and Holocaust Relativization
The example demonstrates how the motif of crimes against 
Native Americans – their deportation and partial an-
nihilation by American colonists and settlers – whose ver-
acity cannot in itself be denied, can nonetheless be applied 
in prejudiced speech. At first glance one might generally 
want to agree with the participant’s statement: “Five 
hundred Native American nations, whole tribes, were elim-
inated. […] I think the Americans should do a lot more 
educational work to reflect on that”18 However, in the 
wider context of speech, this statement can be shown to 
achieve an entirely different purpose than stating and 
evaluating facts of American history.
The interview starts out with the participant being asked to 
explain his affirmative response to the survey item: “I can 
certainly understand that some people don’t like the 
Americans.”19 He asserts that his answer is based on his re-
jection of US foreign policy, i.e. the way in which the 
United States acts as a “world police” forcing other coun-
tries to align with an “American worldview.” Asked by the 
interviewer to more closely describe his associations with 
said “world police,” the participant explains:
Well, I don’t want to come across as a right-wing extremist or 
something like that by any means, but … If I, regarding history, 
come back to the Second World War (incomprehensible) … Of 
course, what happened in Germany was very, very awful, and it 
should never happen again in any nation on earth in this way, 
that is totally clear. But the Americans have now designed prac-
tically the whole European educational system, so that prac-
tically a World War.… Er, and this is the crucial point, I think, at 
which one should become a little vigilant: One single nation 
cannot cause a World War on its own. After all, I think, they 
were all involved, England, France, Italy, Russia […]. And to 
now have the Americans dictate our school system right from 
the beginning, telling us what we are allowed and not allowed to 
know…
Interestingly, the participant does not pick one of the 
events usually cited as current examples for American 
dominance, like the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but 
spontaneously refers to Europe and particularly Germany 
as victims of American power. This turn of the con-
versation reveals that the issue of German national identity 
and its relation to the Nazi past is closely connected to his 
depiction of the United States. His theory about how 
Americans more or less comprehensively control German 
history education conveys a strong sense of being pa-
tronized by a foreign power: in his view Germany is un-
rightfully accused of having caused the Second World War 
and Germans are led to believe so by American indoc-
trination. I argue that this construction is to be seen as an 
ideological expression of a paradox in the participant’s 
construction of national identity. This paradox of German 
post-war identity, which has been described with regard to 
current antisemitism (Holz 2007), consists in distancing 
the in-group from the perpetrators of National Socialism 
and the Holocaust while simultaneously including and 
normalizing them as part of it. In such a perspective, the 
mass murder of European Jews appears primarily as an ob-
stacle to a positive, continuous national identity. To express 
such a positive nationalism, the Holocaust and the Nazi-
past have to be obscured or diminished while simulta-
neously avoiding “coming across as a right-wing 
extremist.” Like in antisemitic constructions, the paradox 
is dissolved here through a reversal of perpetrator and vic-
tim roles (Holz 2007, 39 ff.). As the participant elaborates 
his argument about German history and its (foreign) 
evaluation, the motif of crimes against Native Americans 
comes into play:
Of course, mistakes and acts that do not exactly conform to the 
Geneva Convention were committed by both sides, the Allies 
and their adversaries. But this means America that does not 
have the right to continue to this day condemning Germany 
alone for something the Americans already did before the world 
wars, that is, annihilating whole populations. I think, for 
instance, of the Native Americans. Five hundred Native Ameri-
can nations, whole tribes, were eliminated. […] I think the 
Americans should do a lot more educational work to reflect on 
that, to somehow finally bring – let me say – that balance of jus-
tice into present day Europe.
18 The interview excerpts in section 4 are taken 
from the respective transcripts. In the transcripts 
“(.)” and “(…)” signify short and longer pauses (up 
to 3 seconds), while “[…]” signifies parts of the 
transcript have been omitted for the sake of brevity; 
“…” indicates an unfinished sentence.
19 Item translated by the author. Original German 
item wording: “Ich kann es gut verstehen, wenn 
manchen Leuten die US-Amerikaner unangenehm 
sind” (adopted from Decker et al. 2010).
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After having “normalized” German responsibility for 
World War II, claiming that Allied and Axis forces were 
equally involved in war crimes, the participant moves on to 
a more specific topic, stating that Americans should not 
condemn other deeds committed by Germans either, since 
they themselves committed “the same deeds” before, 
namely “annihilating whole populations.” Here, the partici-
pant is implicitly but clearly invoking the Holocaust and 
equating it to crimes against Native Americans. This refer-
ence to American history thus enables him to relativize the 
Holocaust without ever having to explicitly mention it. The 
motif of crimes against Native Americans provides an anti-
American resolution to the “paradox of normalization” of 
German post-war nationalism (Holz 2007). This function is 
framed by a partial perpetrator-victim reversal, in which 
conflicting aspects of the in-group are externalized as false 
accusations from an out-group. Through the use of the mo-
tifs of an oppressive American “world police” and its con-
trol over European media and education, what should be 
acknowledged as an intrinsic paradox within German post-
war identity becomes a conflict between a consistent, posi-
tive national in-group and a hostile external force. The 
perpetrators of the Holocaust and their successors are 
transformed into the victims of oppressive indoctrination. 
These aspects of anti-American speech also provide an il-
lustrative example of the functional affinity between anti-
Americanism and anti-Semitism, (Markovits 2007, 188 ff.; 
Holz 2005, 103; 2001, 499 ff.). However, in this variety of 
anti-Americanism the perpetrator role is attributed not to 
“the Jews,” as in expressions of secondary antisemitism, but 
to “the Americans.” Given the historical connection of anti-
American and anti-Semitic stereotypes in which “America” 
has often been used as code for “the Jews” (Markovits 2007, 
157 ff.), the boundaries between these attributions are 
rather fuzzy. Yet there is a distinction to be made: The at-
tribution to “Americans” represents a clear “advantage” for 
the speaker insofar as he avoids anti-Semitic speech but still 
can deal with said paradox of national identity in a similar 
way. While the example does not classify as anti-Semitism, 
it would be an oversimplification to view these speech acts 
as strictly distinct from anti-Semitism simply because no 
Jews are mentioned. Jews are not merely unmentioned, but 
systematically omitted as victims of the Holocaust. That 
this omission is achieved by America stereotypes bespeaks 
both a specific connection and a distinction between anti-
Americanism and anti-Semitism.
4.2. Anti-Americanism and Racial Nationalism
My second example of anti-American speech refers to the 
motif of the United States as a racist society. As with the 
previous example, this claim surely cannot be generally re-
jected on a propositional level, since drastic instances of 
racism abound in American history and remain a promi-
nent social issue. However, despite it not being “factually 
wrong” (see section 2), it can nonetheless be utilized in a 
prejudiced way: Talking about racism in the United States 
can serve as a preemptive deflection of the charge of racism 
against a speaker’s in-group. In the following example the 
whole topic of racism is externalized as an “American” 
problem, which gives the speaker the opportunity to in-
dulge in rather open expressions of xenophobia (especially 
towards Turkish immigrants) and racial nationalism, while 
at the same time presenting himself as non-racist. Thus 
anti-American speech can again be viewed as an expression 
of a paradox within nationalist identity construction: to 
support racism while complying to a norm of anti-racism 
(Billig 2012, 140 ff.).
After the participant was initially asked to explain his 
agreement with the item “I tend to find Americans dislik-
able,”20 he talks about his dislike for the way Americans re-
tain a sense of superiority despite their failure to adjust to 
global trends in recent years. He then goes on to relate how 
his hopes for change in this respect were connected to the 
presidency of Barack Obama, but are currently fading:
[…] because the white man is still in charge in the United States, 
that is becoming more and more clear now. They are actually 
wrecking a whole country, just to […] defeat a black president 
and – okay, to consequently regain dominant power […].
20 Item translated by the author. Original German 
wording: “Mir sind die US-Amerikaner eher unsym-
pathisch” (adopted from Decker et al. 2010).
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The participant claims that a racist power elite is deliberately 
harming the US economy in order to bring down President 
Obama. When asked to explain his views on how Obama 
might have a problem because of his skin color, he responds:
Might have? He does have a problem because of his skin color. I 
mean, these […] Tea Partiers […] they openly proclaim that to 
completely defame and embarrass him in public. And to embar-
rass the whole administration, this is bullying or maybe even 
worse, the stuff they are doing over there. […] Well, as a German 
it really makes you wonder how somebody can argue that pub-
licly and with total self-confidence. Only to bring down the gov-
ernment […], only to keep the black man from gaining power.
What is noticeable about this sequence is the rather emphatic 
distinction between the German in-group and an American 
out-group, marked by the phrase “as a German it really 
makes you wonder.” As I will argue in the following, this jux-
taposition of Germans and Americans assumes a functional 
role in the externalization of racism. The externalizing func-
tion of the motif becomes evident as the participant is asked 
whether something similar (racial discrimination of a gov-
ernment official) would be possible in Germany. He objects: 
“How do you mean? Because of racism? […] I don’t think 
so, I don’t think so.” Instead of acknowledging at least the 
possibility of such racist discrimination in Germany, the par-
ticipant reiterates the already invoked clear distinction be-
tween the German in-group and American out-group. The 
reasons for this omission become more evident when he is 
asked whether he could imagine somebody with Turkish 
roots being elected German chancellor:
Oh dear (…) Oh dear, oh, I cannot imagine that [laughing 
slightly] ever happening. I don’t think so. Well, well I think the 
Germans, […] so to speak, are Germans in private. (…) What is 
accepted (.) accepted or, how they say, tolerated, (.) are the Turks 
(.) Turks, Italians, Greeks. I would say they are tolerated. But 
nobody really loves them. […] The Turks do have an aspiration 
to power. […] Well, they lost the battle for Vienna back then, but 
maybe they are infiltrating the country today. I think that’s what 
the Germans are afraid of. Islam, the Turks (.), and you notice 
that (.) sometimes, when everything is being infiltrated. […].
And in a latter sequence he adds:
Well, for all I care Özdemir could become, let’s say, become 
Development Minister or something like that, but he will never 
be Foreign Minister.21 I cannot imagine that happening. And 
there is no chance he will ever become Chancellor.
It becomes obvious in these sequences that the partici-
pant, while emphatically rejecting racism against Obama 
in the United States, actually shares a racist orientation 
himself. He expresses a strong differentialist nationalism 
in emphasizing the superficiality of tolerance for minor-
ity groups and how they are actually rejected by the Ger-
man population.22 These xenophobic attitudes, which are 
presented as publicly disapproved and thus uttered only 
“in private,” are constructed as a constitutive element of 
in-group identity, since Germans are only “Germans in 
private.” Even the slightest mark of an immigrant back-
round in a German citizen, as represented by the 
example of Cem Özdemir, serves as an inhibiting cri-
terion for in-group membership, which clearly points to 
the racist distinction at the heart of this construction. 
However, what is most important here regarding anti-
Americanism is the paradoxical combination of moral 
outrage over racism against an American president and 
the racist exclusion of minority members from political 
office in Germany. This construction can be understood 
as an expression and dissolution of a more general ideo-
logical paradox of racial nationalism in post-war Ger-
many: It is common sense to construct an ethnically 
homogenous core community while the racist and dis-
criminatory consequences of such constructions are sys-
tematically denied (Martin 2010, 71 ff.; Sutterlüty 
2011).23 The image of the United States as a racist so-
ciety, in combination with stereotypes depicting America 
as “cultureless” that cannot be presented in greater detail 
here, allows the participant to resolve this paradox by ex-
ternalizing the issue of racism. Because he sees America 
as an exception within a world of racially founded 
21  Cem Özdemir is a German politician of Turkish 
extraction. He has been a member of the Bundestag 
and the European Parliament, and is currently co-
leader of the Green Party.
22 Differentialism is a term coined by French 
political scientist Pierre-André Taguieff to describe a 
current form of racism relying on cultural distinc-
tions rather than biological ones (Martin 2010, 44).
23 I want to stress that such denial does not necess-
arily have to be conceived as a conscious strategy, 
nor as an individually motivated suppression. I sug-
gest conceptualizing this paradox or “double sanc-
tioning” (Billig 2012, 144) first and foremost as a 
genuinely social phenomenon of “everyday ideo-
logy” (Martin 2010, 62). It provides the basis for 
paradoxical constructions that may not be recog-
nized as such by the actors, as most probably holds 
true for the example presented here.
IJCV : Vol. 7 (1) 2013, pp. 91 – 107
Knappertsbusch: The Meaning of Anti-Americanism 105
nations, i.e. a nation which consists solely of immigrants 
but somehow still constitutes a distinct national identity, 
it can serve as the external locus of “illegitimate” racial 
discrimination. Because the United States is the one 
nation where inequality and discrimination cannot be 
justified by traditional ethnic homogeneity, it is the place 
where these phenomena appear as illegitimate “racism.” 
Thus, this application of America motifs can be regarded 
as anti-American prejudice in that it serves to dissolve 
the paradox of a nationalist identity construction that 
simultaneously endorses anti-racist and racist practices.
In summary, these examples give an impression of how 
prejudiced speech can be enacted through the use of 
America stereotypes. What the participants presented as 
criticism of American society and politics can be read as 
expressions of racist and revisionist constructions of 
national identity. Applying the heuristic distinction of 
America motifs and anti-American uses, we have seen 
how only the combination of both these aspects of speech 
creates a performative effect that can be labeled anti-
American. Realizations of the semantic motifs and func-
tional aspects could be imagined in different, 
non-anti-American contexts: It is of course possible to 
criticize racism in the United States without being anti-
American, just as other semantic motifs, not referring to 
the United States, can provide the means to express a 
racial or revisionist nationalism. It is the combination of 
reinforcing racial nationalism through the expression of 
certain America stereotypes that makes it an anti-
American performance.
What may seem surprising about these examples is that 
anti-Americanism is not uttered primarily as hostility or 
discriminatory intention towards Americans. While cer-
tainly applying negative images of the United States, this 
kind of anti-Americanism rather seems to be an accessory 
to other forms of prejudice and ideological patterns, such 
as racism, antisemitism, and nationalism. However, since it 
would be problematic to limit our notion of prejudice ex-
clusively to forms of direct enmity or discriminatory inten-
tions (Martin 2010, 50 ff.; Wetherell and Potter 1992, 69 
ff.), this should not be regarded as a counterargument to 
classifying the given examples as anti-American speech, but 
rather as a deeper insight into the flexibility of everyday 
anti-Americanism and an informative example of how dif-
ferent forms of prejudice interconnect and support each 
other (Baethge et al. 2010, 382).
5. Conclusion
Discussions on what anti-Americanism is are often con-
nected to the question of how anti-American prejudice can 
be distinguished from legitimate criticism, i.e. how the con-
cept of anti-Americanism should be applied. I argue that 
this problem of a general concept of anti-Americanism that 
is able to grasp the flexible and situated character of preju-
diced speech is often misrepresented as solely a problem of 
imprecise definitions. As an alternative approach, a speech 
act or practice theoretical framework was proposed, in 
which the performative aspects of both anti-American dis-
course and scientific discourse on anti-Americanism are sys-
tematically integrated into the conceptualization of 
anti-Americanism. Building on a distinction of semantic 
America motifs and their situated use, this approach attempts 
to conceptualize anti-Americanism as a family of per-
formative speech acts, bound by similarity rather than uni-
versally common features. Qualitative research methods 
were shown to be essential to the empirical application of 
this approach, since they provide the interpretive means to 
read utterances as anti-American in a broader context of 
speech. This focus on the performative aspect of anti-
Americanism was presented within a framework of em-
pirically grounded theory construction, emphasizing the 
reciprocal relation between theoretical and empirical re-
search. Two examples illustrated how such an approach can 
be applied. In both cases anti-American speech did not pri-
marily express dislike or discriminatory intentions towards 
Americans, but rather functioned as part of a broader ideo-
logical constellation incorporating elements of differentialist 
racism and secondary anti-Semitism. It was shown how 
anti-American speech serves in both cases to express and 
simultaneously dissolve paradoxes of national identification. 
In the first example it provided the means for latently invok-
ing and relativizing the Holocaust, thereby allowing for a 
simultaneous distancing from and integration of Nazi per-
petrators into the national in-group. In the second example 
the motif of “American racism” functioned as a means to 
externalize the issue of racism from the in-group, while sim-
IJCV : Vol. 7 (1) 2013, pp. 91 – 107
Knappertsbusch: The Meaning of Anti-Americanism 106
ultaneously employing racist criteria in its construction. Al-
though these are of course only tentative results, it appears 
that there is a sort of “division of labor” between different 
forms of prejudice: While racism and antisemitism serve a 
rather “direct” purpose in national identity construction, 
e.g. homogenizing and/or glorifying it, anti-Americanism 
seems to reflect on the paradoxes and conflicts which arise 
from such identity constructions in the context of official 
anti-racist or anti-anti-Semitic norms. In the examples pres-
ented here, anti-Americanism seems to not be concerned 
primarily with the derogation or discrimination of “Ameri-
cans” (and a corresponding relative evaluation of the in-
group), but much more with “fixing” the problems a 
nationalist identification creates through its racist and 
antisemitic expressions. Of course this is not to say that all 
anti-Americanism will take on such a reflexive function. The 
empirical examples presented here merely provide a first 
impression of what a mapping of anti-American speech 
could look like. Therefore, future research should work to-
wards expanding the qualitative empirical base for theory 
construction, to broaden our understanding of anti-
Americanism as part of everyday ideology.
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